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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
MUNICIPAL RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT
IN MARYLAND
By GEORGE L. CLARKE*
In this era of increasing governmental participation in
so many of the innumerable activities that constitute pres-
ent-day life, of greater social consciousness and humani-
tarian trends (at least in this country), it is somewhat
startling to realize that the maxim "the King can do no
wrong" may still be invoked to prevent redress to one who
has suffered a civil wrong at the hands of an agent, officer,
or employee of a municipality. Legal writers everywhere
have sensed the anomaly involved and, almost uniformly,
have levelled shafts of criticism at the existing situation.1
Each analysis and subsequent complaint recognizes the om-
nipotence of stare decisis and the cry is for remedial legis-
lation. The purpose of this comment is to present a brief
critical view of the subject and the more important aspects
of 'the pertinent Maryland law.
Professor Borchard states :2
"The reason for this long continued and growing
injustice in Anglo-American law rests, of course, upon
a medieval English theory that 'the King can do no
wrong', which without sufficient understanding was- in-
troduced with the common law into this country and
has survived mainly by reason of its antiquity ...
The maxim really meant that the King was not privi-
legeds to do wrong. If his acts were against the law
they were injuriae (wrongs) and a considerable meas-
ure of redress was obtainable though not in damages."
One of the earlier English cases which served as prece-
dent for modern authority was Russell v. Men of Devon.'
In that case the plaintiff sought to recover damages for in-
* Third Year Student, University of Maryland School of Law.
1Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 Yale L. J. 1, 129, 229;
(1926) 36 Ibid 1, 757, 1039; (1928) 28 Col. L. R. 577, 734; Tooke, Eatension
of Municipal Liability in Tort (1932) 19 Va. L. R. 97; Seasongood, Munici-
pal Corporations, Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test
(1936) 22 Va. L. R. 910; Doddridge, Distinction Between Governmental and
Proprietary Functions of Municipal Corporations (1925) 23 Mich. L. R.
325; Freedman, Liability in Tort of Municipal Corporations in Missouri
(1938) 3 Mo. L. R. 275; Municipal Tort Liabilit V-A Proposal (1938) 23
Iowa L. R. 392; Note, Should We Abandon the Distinction Between Gov-
ernmental and Proprietary Function (1920) 34 Harv. L. R. 66. For other
articles and texts see those listed 20 A. B. A. J. 747, 748 n. i.20p. cit. supra, note 1, 34 Yale L. J. 1, 2.
3 Italics supplied.
42 T. R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K. B. 1788).
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juries suffered in consequence of a bridge being out of
repair and the attempt was made to charge two of the
county inhabitants in behalf of all the rest. The King's
Bench held that no civil action lay against the inhabitants
of a county for an individual injury in consequence of a
breach of their public duty. But, as appears in County
Commissioners of Anne Arundel County v. Duckett5 where-
in the Maryland Court quotes Chancellor Kent6 in speak-
ing of Russell v. Men of Devon, "The county was not a cor-
poration for that purpose, and had no corporate fvnd.'7
Today, of course, municipalities and county commissioners
are incorporated bodies possessing corporate funds, so the
injustice which might have resulted had the two defendants
in Russell v. Men of Devon been charged for all the county
inhabitants could no longer occur. Municipal corporations
are, nevertheless, still permitted to enjoy the immunity of
the sovereign in a large class of tort cases, specifically,
"where a municipality is engaged in the performance of a
governmental function as an agent of the State, the same
principle which protects the state from liability also pro-
tects the municipality charged with a tort." 7
A governmental function (also called "public", "legis-
lative", "judicial") is that type of function, wherein, as
indicated, no liability rests upon the municipality, and is
to be distinguished from a proprietary function (also
called "private", "corporate", "municipal") in the per-
formance of which the city is, as any individual, responsible
for its torts. This dual classification of municipal functions
serves, as a divining rod to determine municipal liability.
If the function in the performance of which the injury oc-
curred was governmental, the plaintiff has no remedy
against the city; if the function was proprietary he may
be compensated. The difficulty rests in the classification
of the various functions of the city government, and, as
might be expected, the courts of this country labor greatly,
and with inconsistent results, to rationalize their find-
ings. "The rules sought to be established in determining
whether a given function is governmental or proprietary
are as logical as those governing French irregular verbs."s
Let us assume, however, that the classification has, been
made and the injured party learns that he was unfortunate
5 20 Md. 468, 479 (1864).
a Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns (N. Y.) 439 (1820).
1 M. and C. C. of Balto. v. State, use of Blueford, et al., 173 Md. 267, 195
A. 571, 574 (1937).
8 Seasongood, op. cit. supra note 1.
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enough to have been injured in a public park rather than
on a public highway, that his injury therefore arose in a
function wherein the city was acting in its governmental
role, and that, consequently, he cannot recover. What
mental anodyne may he take to reconcile himself to his
plight? Six reasons are usually given to support the rule
of non-liability for injuries occasioned in the course of
governmental functions.
1. "The state is sovereign and the municipality its gov-
ernmental agency; no suit can be brought against the state
without its consent, therefore none against the municipal-
ity." The Supreme Court, in Chisholm v. Georgia,10 de-
molished the idea of sovereign immunity, and Mr. Justice
Holmes, similarly unimpressed with the royal inability to
err as a democratic concept, was led to declare "a sovereign
is exempt from suit, not because of any formal concep-
tion or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the au-
thority that makes the law on which the right depends.""
However correct this view may be as applied to the State,
"the subordinate legislative powers of a municipal char-
acter which have been or may be lodged in the city corpo-
rations-do not make these bodies sovereigns," said the
Supreme Court,'2 and the injured party will be inclined to
agree.
2. The municipality derives no profit or monetary re-
turn from the performance of a public function, therefore
it need not recompense the injured party.3 But the in-
jured party may properly reply that tort liability is not
predicated on the wrongdoer's being engaged in a profit-
able enterprise at the time when the injury occurs.
3. The orderly and efficient administration of city af-
fairs will be interfered with if the city is held liable for.
employees' torts."4 But, says one writer, "To submit, in
- 34 H. L. R. 66, 67 (1920) ; see also the Blueford case, supra note 7, 574
for language supporting the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
10 2 Dallas 419 (1793).
1 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 353 (1906).
1 2Metropolitan Railroad Co. v. D. C.. 132 U. S. 1. 9 (1889).
18 Blueford case, supra note 7, 576: "where the act . .. is solely for the
public benefit, with no profit or emolument enuring to the municipality .. .
and has in it no element of private interest, it is governmental in its
nature." See also: M. and C. C. Balto. v. State, use of Ahrens, 168 Md.
619, 179 A. 169, 99 A. L. R. 680 (1935) ; also, Wallace v. Balto., 123 Md.
638, 91 A. 687 (1914).
24 Blueford case, supra note 7; "... (to hold the city liable) would so
hamper and impede the orderly exercise of Its executive and administrative
powers as to prevent the proper and adequate performance of its govern-
mental functions." p. 574.
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justification of the rule that the immunity is necessary for
the proper functioning of the city, is to propound the ob-
vious contradiction that the agency formed to protect so-
ciety is under no obligation, when acting itself, to protect
an individual member of society."'" Furthermore, the re-
sult of imposing responsibility for torts would probably be
greater efficiency. We are more likely to err when we know
our errors will cost us nothing.
4. When officers and employees of the municipal gov-
ernment are engaged in the performance of governmental
duties they are agents of the State, and not of the city, and
respondeat superior is therefore inapplicable. But the law
of agency has it that the fact of agency is determined by
considerations of control, employment and dismissal, pay-
ment of wages, 16 etc., rather than by the nature or char-
acter of the employment. Maryland, nevertheless, and the
weight of authority 7 hold that (police officers, for example)
"whether appointed by it or not they are not municipal
servants or agents-and municipalities for which they are
appointed will not be responsible for their acts or omis-
218sions....,
5. The property of the city would be sequestered and
made subject to judgments obtained against it with the re-
sult that the objects for which the city was formed would
be frustrated. But, says Professor Seasongood,1 "the
right to sue is, not dependent on whether a judgment . . .
may be enforced by execution or at all". Further, "those
jurisdictions which allow execution against city property
are careful to limit seizure to such as is held in the city's
private capacity. There is nothing extraordinary in hav-
ing judgments regarded as just another expense of the mu-
nicipal undertaking and provision made for them by a tax
levy to set up a judgment or contingent fund."
6. The act whence the injury arose was done in obedi-
ence to a "mandatory" statute; the city was thus behav-
ing as a mere instrumentality of the state, and the sover-
eign's immunity therefore attached. On the other hand,
where the statute, in the execution of which the wrong oc-
curred, is "permissive"' or "discretionary", the city's un-
dertaking in relation thereto subjects the city to the lia-
bility of a private person. This view is unsound, it is sub-
15 Freedman, op cit. supra note 1, 277.
16 2 Mechem, Law of Agency (2nd Ed. 1914), Sec. 1863.
11 i9 R. C. L., See. 399.
18 Wynkoop v. Hagerstown, 159 Md. 194, 201, 150 A. 447 (1930).
1 Op. cit. supra note 1.
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mitted, for where there is an unquestioned duty to be ex-
ercised for the community the fact that the performance
thereof was "mandatory" rather than voluntarily assumed
under a "permissive" statute "has never been the start-
ing point for liability in the law of torts ".2
Instances wherein the liability of the municipality is
uncontested indicate the fallacies inherent in the reason-
ing of the Courts to support the rule of non-liability for
creation or permitting nuisances, 21 in contract,2 2 in ad-
miralty, 23 in trespass. 14 The absurdities involved in the
classification of municipal functions are apparent in the
following: ". . . water (private) is intimately connected
with health (public). It is used to sprinkle streets and to
flush and clean them (public) and sewers, for fire protec-
tion (public), in the cleaning and servicing of schools and
municipal universities (public), and other public build-
ings, in the upkeep of parks (public). . . . How can an
activity so pervasive and essential be justly classified as
private and non-essential?"125  The question is obviously
rhetorical. But many states, including Maryland, have an-
swered that maintaining a waterworks and supplying
water for domestic use is a private non-essential function.
Let us now examine the Maryland law.
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS
Parks
Maryland joins the weight of authority2 in classifying
the maintenance and operation of public parks as a gov-
ernmental function in the case of Baltimore v. State, Use of
Ahrens, 27 which was confirmed in the recently decided Bal-
timore v. State, Use of Blueford et al.25 In the latter case
an eleven year old girl drowned in a public swimming pool
maintained by the city in Riverside Park. The action was
brought on the theory that the guards employed by the
20 34 H. L. R. 66, 68.
21 Taylor v. M. and C. C. Balto., 130 Md. 133, 147, 99 A. 900 (1917). See
cases cited in notes 74 and 75 infra; also 75 A. L. R. 1196, 1199.
2219 R. C. L., p. 1059.
23 19 R. C. L., p. 1136.
21 M. & C. of Frostburg v. Hitchins, 99 Md. 617, 59 A. 49, 23 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 159, note (1904).
25 Seasongood, op. cit. supra note 1, 916.
2629 A. L. R. 863; see also: 24 Va. L. R. 430 (1938).
27 168 Md. 619, 179 A. 169, 99 A. L. R. 680 (1935) ; in 22 Va. L. R. 97, 98,
speaking of the Ahrens case, the writer says it is "an extreme example of
outmoded legal reasoning and makes for a result that is socially undesir-
able. Fortunately, it is contrary to the overwhelming weight of modern
authority."
28 Supra note 7.
19391
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
city were negligent in permitting the child to enter the
deep water zone and in allowing her to drown when they
knew or should have known she was in danger. The Court
of Appeals reversed the lower court, which held the city
liable, and said, "it is better that the adequate perform-
ance of such an act be secured by public prosecution and
punishment of officials who violate their duties ... than to
disburse public funds dedicated to the maintenance of
such public conveniences as public parks, playgrounds, hos-
pitals, swimming pools, and beaches ..... " It is submitted
that a disbursement of trust funds might well operate to
the detriment of an eleemosynary institution but the con-
tinued existence of the municipality and of such activities
as mentioned by the Court of Appeals could be sustained
through exercise of the taxing power.
Schools
In Gold v. Baltimore,9 it was held that in maintaining
schools the city performed a governmental duty. The in-
fant plaintiff, whose leg was broken by the falling of a
school door, was thus denied recovery. School children
may therefore be subjected to the dangerous condition of
buildings, and the negligence of the city's officers, servants
and agents without possibility of recovery from the city.
The Gold Case cites an earlier Maryland case, Weddle v.
School Commissioners of Frederick County,30 which held
"a quasi corporation or governmental agency, such as a
board of school commissioners having charge of the pub-
lic schools in a county, is not liable to an individual in an
action of tort for negligence unless such liability is im-
posed by Statute." Consequently, in that case, the fa-
ther of a school girl was denied recovery for the latter's
death, which was caused by the child's being knocked down
by a single strand of wire strung at a height of four feet
between trees on the school grounds. When it is real-
ized that attendance at public schools is, virtually compul-
sory for many Maryland children, the rule of non-liability
seems particularly severe °a
Police and Fire Departments
"The protection of the citizen against pestilence, dis-
ease, violence or disorder is essentially a governmental
function to be exercised by the state under its police power
21 137 Md. 335, 112 A. 588, 14 A. L. R. 1389 (1921).
30 94 Md. 334, 51 A. 289 (1902).
Boa Md. Code Supp., Art. 77, Secs. 220, 221.
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through proper agents. (The) administration of the crim-
inal laws, the conservation of the public peace, or the pro-
tection of the citizen from violence" '31 is unmistakably a
governmental task. Thus, in Wynkoop v. Hagerstown,2
the failure of the city police department to prevent an in-
toxicated person from discharging a fire-arm did not ren-
der the city liable to one injured by the discharge, and,
even though there was a breach by the police department
of a governmental duty, the failure amounted to negligence
in the exercise of a governmental function, so there was
no recovery for the plaintiff. Although the common law
rule, still observed in Maryland, is that a municipal corpo-
ration can incur no liability by reason of defaults of its
police or fire departments, "an overwhelming opinion
throughout the world in favor of the assumption of com-
munity liability for torts of public officers may be regard-
ed as representing a growing moral conviction ... .
Public Buildings
The recently decided County Commissioners of Har-
ford County v. Love 4 held that one injured by falling from
a platform at the bottom of stairs leading to the basement
of the county courthouse cannot recover damages from the
county, such injury having been received in the use of
accommodations gratuitously provided for public conven-
ience in a building maintained by the county for govern-
mental purposes. "The judicial and administrative pur-
poses to which such buildings are devoted necessarily im-
press them with a governmental character." This view
concurs with the weight of authority.15
PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS
Markets
In Reed v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,8 the
plaintiff tripped over a platform which was lying flat on
the cement walkway in front of a stall in Cross Street Mar-
ket. The lower court granted the city's demurrer prayer.
This ruling was reversed on appeal. The Court said the
11 Supra note 18.
32 Ibid.
81 Municipal ResponsibilitV for the Torts of Policemen, 42 Yale L. J. 241,
244 (1932). See also: 19 R. C. L. 1116, 1119; 84 A. L. R. 514, 33 A. L. R.
688, 9 A. L. R. 143.
173 Md. 429, 196 A. 122 (1938).
19 R. C. L., p. 1123; 43 C. J., p. 1166.
28171 Md. 115, 188 A. 15 (1936).
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city's duty to the public was comparable to that of a de-
partment store owner to his customers. As customer-in-
vitees, persons using the market were entitled to the exer-
cise of reasonable care on the part of the proprietor, the
city. ". . . in owning the market and deriving a revenue
from its stalls by way of rentals (the city) was acting
within its proprietary or private character, and would,
therefore, be liable for negligence, assuming that, under
similar facts and circumstances, liability would exist as
against an individual." 7
Removal of Ashes and Household Refuse
In Consolidated Apartment House Company v. Balti-
more,38 it was argued that the city's relation to the removal
of ashes, etc., was so closely akin to matters touching health
and fire conditions that the function partook of the latter's
governmental character. The Court's holding illustrates
the unsatisfactory nature of the governmental-proprietary
classification. ". .. the city has a proprietary interest in
its thoroughfares, and while the removal of ashes and
household refuse may contribute to the public health, it
also bears a close relationship to the obligation of the city
to keep its streets and alleys clean and free from obstruc-
tions and safe for travel."' 9 The power and duty to re-
move ashes and household refuse was therefore held to
rest upon the city in its private and corporate capacity.
4 0
Streets, Highways, Nuisances
The most profitable source of litigation against the city
is for injuries received by persons using the streets and
highways, and, although "it is difficult to discover any logi-
cal distinction between the governmental character of such
a duty as, that of maintaining the public highways . . .
and that of maintaining public parks ",41_1 'There is no
question that, by the great weight of authority, the rule
of law is that it is a private proprietary obligation of mu-
nicipal corporations to keep their streets and public ways
reasonably safe for travel in the ordinary manner, and
.7 171 Md. 115, 118, 188 A. 15, 16; see also: Balto. v. Brannon, 14 Md. 227
(1859).
38131 Md. 523, 102 A. 920, L. R. A. 1918 C. 1181 (1917).
, Ibid, 131 Md. 523, 536.
40 It is of Interest to note that the declaration in the Consolidated Apart-
ment House case, supra note 38, was held demurrable because of the ab-
sence of averments to show that there was a sufficient fund wherewith the
function could be performed.
'1 State, use of Blueford, supra note 7.
[VOL. III
MUNICIPAL TORTS
to prevent and remove a nuisance affecting the use and
safety of these public ways. This rule is founded on the
principles of agency and torts, and exemplifies the basic
conception that everyone, in carrying through an affirma-
tive course of conduct, must, at his peril, act with due care,
according to the circumstances ".42 The duty running to
those injured by defects in streets and highways arises
from a principle stated, and often repeated by the Court
of Appeals,, in the leading case of Baltimore v. Marriott:
"When a statute confers a power upon a corporation to
be exercised for -the public good, the exercise of the power
is not merely discretionary but imperative, and the words
'power and authority' in such case may be construed duty
and obligation." This language is, of course, broad enough
to include governmental and proprietary functions, and,
if taken literally, would, under the Charter and Public
Local Laws of Baltimore City,"' for example, place liabil-
ity on the city for torts occurring in the performance of
the functions of the fire department, health department,
hospitals, parks, police department, etc., but clearly the
quoted statement was only intended to embrace the per-
formance of those functions that were otherwise proprie-
tary. 4 4a
Municipal corporations have been held responsible to
persons injured on defective highways,4 5 sidewalks,46 bridg-
'
2 Balto. v. Eagers, 167 Md. 128, 136, 173 A. 56 (1934).
"9 Md. 160, 174 (1856).
"Sec. 6, sub-sections 5, 9, 10, 16, 17. See: Gutowski v. M. and C. C. of
Balto., 127 Md. 502, 508, 96 A. 630 (1916), where the court says: "but in
every instance in which the liability referred to has been enforced by this
court, the default or neglect related to a duty or undertaking in reference
to which the municipality had a proprietary or participating interest."
"a It Is interesting to note that Maryland does not subscribe to the
"mandatory or permissive statute" rationale suggested supra note 20 as a
reason for excusing liability. The mandatory interpretation required by
the Court of Appeals is held to create rather than destroy liability.
11 Since Md. Code Supp., Art. 25, Sec. 1 declares the County Commis-
sioners of each county to be a corporation, charged with the care of roads,
etc., and empowered to tax to provide therefor, such bodies are treated as
municipal corporations. County Comm'rs of Anne Arundel County v.
Duckett, 20 Md. 468 (1864) (horse killed because of bad state of repair of
road) ; County Comm'rs of Allegany County v. Broadwaters, 69 Md. 533,
16 A. 223 (1888) (plaintiff fell off side of road where there was a precipice,
no railing being there to prevent such accident) ; Tyson v. Baltimore
County, 28 Md. 510 (1868) (a wall was built to protect road from water
from a dam; plaintiff suffered consequential damages; held, damnumn
absque injuria) Walter v. County Comm'rs of Wicomico County, 35 Md.
385, 394 (1872) (obstructions erected in highway caused consequential in-
jury to plaintiff's mills and dam from backwater) ; County Comm'rs Anne
Arundel Co. v. Duvall, 54 Md. 350, 355 (1880) (laborers cut tree to be used
in road repairs which fell on plaintiff passing in road) ; Baltimore County
v. Wilson, 97 Md. 207, 54 A. 71, 56 A. 596 (1903) (County Commissioners
not liable for injuries from defective highway after statute deprived them
1939]
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es,47 and footways. 5 In such actions the usual principles
of tort liability are applicable. The municipality's lia-
bility is not that of an insurer, nor is it responsible for
every unevenness or roughness, but its duty is to maintain
the streets and highways in a reasonably safe condition. 9
This duty is non-delegable and cannot be avoided by em-
of control of road); Charles County v. Mandanyohl, 93 Md. 150, 48 A.
1058 (1901) (plaintiffs vehicle wheel went in deep hole and plaintiff was
injured by stepping therein); Howard County v. Pindell, 119 Md. 69, 85
A. 1041 (1912) (hole in highway) ; Richardson v. Comm'rs Kent County,
120 Md. 153, 87 A. 747 (1913) (although Road Engineer not appointed by
the Commissioners, latter held responsible for his negligence, such engineer
being, to some extent, under their control) ; City of Baltimore v. Leonard,
129 Md. 621, 99 A. 891 (1917) (stake, driven in roadway by contractor em-
ployed by city, caught plaintiff's dress causing her to fall) ; State, use of
Biggs, v. Balto., 129 Md. 686, 99 A. 860 (1917) (City must erect barriers
or railings at dangerous places) ; M. and C. C. of Balto. v. Bassett, 132
Md. 427, 104 A. 39 (1918) (hole in macadamized highway); County
Comm'rs of Kent County v. Pardee, 15 Md. 68, 134 A. 33 (1926) (jolt caused
by hole in road near bridge caused steering mechanism to lock and car
plunged off bridge) ; Harford County v. House, 106 Md. 439, 67 A. 273 (1907)
(horse fell in hole in road) ; Hagerstown v. Hertzler, 167 Md. 518, 175 A.
447 (1934) (guy wire over grass strip between pavement and curb caused
fall).
46 Vannort v. Comm'rs of Chestertown, 132 Md. 685, 104 A. 113 (1918)
Balto. v. Walter, 98 Md. 637, 57 A. 4 (1904) ; Keen v. Havre de Grace, 93
Md. 34, 48 A. 444 (1901) ; Cordish v. Bloom, 138 Md. 81, 113 A. 578 (1921).
" County Comm'rs Pr. Geo.'s County v. Burgess, 61 Md. 29 (1883)
Adams v. County Comm'rs Somerset County, 106 Md. 197, 66 A. 695 (1907)
County Comm'rs Garrett County v. Blackburn, 105 Md. 226, 66 A. 31
(1907); County Comm's Balto. County v. Baker, 44 Md. 1 (1875); Eyler
v. County Comm'rs of Allegany County, 49 Md. 257 (1878) ; Charles v. M.
and C. C. Balto., 138 Md. 523, 114 A. 565 (1921) ; Bembe v. County Comm'rs
Anne Arundel County, 94 Md. 321, 51 A. 179 (1902).
" M. and C. C. of Balto. v. Eagers, 167 Md. 128, 173 A. 56 (1934). In
this case the city authorities had a tree removed from a public square.
The tree was twenty feet from a walk used by pedestrians. The court
held that even though the utility and beauty of the square were increased
by such removal, that the safety of streets and footpaths required para-
mount care on the part of the city and it was held liable for the death
of one upon whom a large limb of the tree had fallen. See also: Balto.
v. Burke, 127 Md. 554, 96 A. 693 (1916) (approach to markets must be kept
in safe condition). Another case which, like the Eagers case supra. shows
the overlapping between governmental and proprietary functions is Birck-
head v. M. and C. C. Balto., 197 A. 615 (Md. 1937). Municipal.non-liability
was urged here because the construction and maintenance of highways
through parks was said to be a governmental function. The court was
not required to express an opinion on this point, but it is submitted that
the use of the park highways is to such a large extent for ordinary trans-
portation between points outside the park rather than for recreational
purposes, that the regular rule of liability for care of the highways should
be applicable.
49 Cordish v. Bloom, 138 Md. 81, 85, 113 A. 578 (1921): "it cannot be
held responsible for every depression, difference in grade, or unevenness in
sidewalks . . . without burdening the property owners with unreasonable
and unnecessary taxation." See also: Magaha v. Hagerstown, 95 Md. 62,
76, 51 A. 837, 93 Am. St. R. 317 (1902) ; Lynch v. Balto., 169 Md. 623, 182
A. 582 (1936) ; Balto. v. Thompson, 171 Md. 460, 189 A. 822 (1936); County
Comm'rs Anne Arundel County v. Vanskiver, 166 Md. 481, 171 A. 705
(1934).
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ploying an independent contractor ;o nor does the fact that
the obstruction was placed thereon by a third person ab-
solve the city's liability. 51 The municipality's responsibil-
ity is restricted by the necessity of notice: "Before . ..
the municipality can be made liable in any case, it must
be shown that it had actual or constructive notice of the
bad condition of the streets." ' 51 It is not, however, neces-
sary to allege in the declaration notice on the part of the
city as to the defective condition.5 3  Before any liability
whatsoever may be asserted against the city an express
or implied acceptance .of the dedication of the street must
be shown.54  The plaintiff must not be guilty of contribu-
tory negligence.55 He may be justified in assuming that it
is reasonably safe for travel, but must use ordinary pru-
dence to discover such defects or obstructions as might
cause injury.5 6 The city must anticipate possible injuries
to pedestrians from building operations carried on near
the street and must pass regulations and enforce them in
order to claim full performance of its duty as against a
"0 M. and C. C. Balto. v. Leonard, 129 Md. 621, 625, 99 A. 891, (1917) : "a
corporation on whom positive duties are imposed by law cannot avoid lia-
bility for injuries resulting from failure to perform such duties by employ-
ing a contractor for the purpose; nor in such case is the fact that the
injuries resulted from the contractor's negligence a defense." See also:
Thillman v. M. and C. C. Balto., 111 Md. 131, 73 A. 722 (1909) ; Hanrahan
v. Balto., 114 Md. 517, 80 A. 312 (1911) ; Balto. v. O'Donnell, 53 Md. 110
(1879).
51 Havre de Grace v. Fletcher, 112 Md. 562, 77 A. 114 (1910).
'2 Annapolis v. Stallings, 125 Md. 343, 346, 93 A. 974 (1915); Comm'rs
Howard County v. Pindell, 119 Md. 69, 85 A. 1041 (1912) ; Harford County
v. Hause, 106 Md. 439, 67 A. 273 (1907) ; Comm'rs of Delmar v. Venables,
125 Md. 471, 476, 94 A. 89 (1915) : "After a street has been out of repair so
that the defect has become known and notorious to those traveling the
street, and there has been full opportunity for the municipality through
Its agents charged with that duty, to learn of its existence and repair it, the
law imputes to it notice and charges It with negligence."; Comm'rs of Balto.
County v. Collins, 158 Md. 335, 148 A. 242 (1930) ; Citizens Savings Bank v.
Covington, 199 A. 849 (Md. 1938) ; M. and C. C. of Balto. v. Walker, 98 Md.
637, 57 A. 4 (1904) (the city is not entitled to notice where the obstruction
was placed in the street by itself) ; Guest v. Church Hill, 90 Md. 689, 695,
45 A. 882 (1900) ; Hitchins v. Frostburg, 68 Md. 100, 11 A. 826 (1887) ;
Keen v. Havre de Grace, 93 Md. 34, 48 A. 444 (1901) ; Long v. B. F. Sweeten
& Son, 123 Md. 88, 90 A. 782 (1914) (city not liable where no notice of
defect),
51 Md. Code, Art. 75, Sec. 38; see: The Law of Negligence as Applied
to Municipal Corporation8, by Edwin J. Wolf, Daily Record, April 21, 1933.
51 Kennedy v. M. and C. C. Cumberland, 65 Md. 514. 521, 9 A. 234, 57
Am. Rep. 346 (1886).
55 Irwin v. Sprigg, 6 Gill 200, 46 Am. Dec. 667 (1847) ; Knight v. Balto.,
97 Md. 647, 55 A. 388 (1903) ; Duross v. Balto., 136 Md. 56, 110 A. 98
(1920) ; Burns v. Balto., 138 Md. 582, 115 A. 111 (1921) ; Balto. v. Bassett,
132 Md. 427, 104 A. 39 (1918) ; Miller v. Balto., 161 Md. 312, 157 A. 289
(1931) ; Balto. v. Poe, 161 Md. 334, 156 A. 888 (1931) ; Balto. v. Grossfield,
173 Md. 197, 195 A. 554 (1938).
."Annapolis v. Stallings, 125 Md. 343, 93 A. 974 (1915).
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claim for injury ;57 it must provide barriers, signals or
warnings where the place might be dangerous; the test
of danger is not the distance of the dangerous object or
place from the highway but whether the reasonably pru-
dent man would be subjected to such imminent danger that
a barrier is needed to insure safety;"8 it must take steps
to warn travellers of obstructions which might not be seen
under reasonably foreseeable weather conditions, as by pro-
viding proper lighting ;59 but a traveller cannot recover for
injuries sustained as a result of conditions encountered be-
yond the limits of the highway.60
At this point it is appropriate to consider a peculiar
circumstance with regard to the Police Department in
Baltimore City, that is, "inasmuch as the police depart-
ment of the City is controlled by a Commission (now Com-
missioner) appointed by the Governor of the State, and
operating independently of the municipal government, the
City is not liable for damages on account of the non-en-
forcement of its police regulations except in cases where
its own conduct has produced the conditions which caused
the injury."61 In Altvater v. Baltimore,2 it was held that
the City was not liable to a pedestrian who had been in-
jured by a speeding sled as it had no control over the
Police Commissioners in exclusive charge of the nuisance
complained of. In Sinclair v. Baltimore,"' the City's non-
liability was upheld for the same reason and injuries re-
sulting from collision with building materials left in front
of a building in the course of erection went uncompensated.
Similarly, in Taxi-Cab Company v. Baltimore,4 and in Gu-
towski v. Baltimore 5 the City escaped liability because
its Police Department was under State control.
11 Hagerstown v. Crowl, 128 Md. 556, 97 A. 544 (1916).
18 Balto. v. State, use of Cirtout, 146 Md. 440, 126 A. 130 (1924).
59 Balto. v. Thompson, 171 Md. 460, 189 A. 822 (1937) ; Balto. v, Beck, 96
Md. 183, 53 A. 976 (1903).
60 Birckhead v. Balto., 197 A. 615 (Md. 1938).
01 Gutowski v. Balto., 127 Md. 502, 505, 96 A. 630 (1916) ; see: Charter of
Balto. City (1927), See. 740, providing for the appointment by the Governor
of a Police Commissioner, who has supplanted the Commission referred to,
and subsequent sections giving the Commissioner full control over the de-
partment. See also: See. 6, sub-section 18, wherein the independence of
the Police Commissioner from the Mayor and other municipal officers is
asserted; and Sec. 744 which places the duty to "prevent and remove
nuisances from all the streets and highways . . ." on the Commissioner.
0231 Md. 462, 465 (1869).
a8 59 Md. 592 (1883).
6, 118 Md. 359, 84 A. 548 (1912) (taxi damaged by collision with build-
ing materials in street).
65 127 Md. 502, 96 A. 630 (1916) : In this case the negligence complained
of was the city's failure to enforce an ordinance which prohibited the use
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Another line of cases illustrates those instances where-
in "the city is 'instrumental in creating the occasion for the
obstruction complained of' or takes part in making or caus-
ing it. ' ' 66 In such cases Baltimore City occupies "the same
position as other cities and towns in the State would be
in for injuries sustained by reason of such alleged de-
fects. 1 67 Consequently, liability has been imposed where
the injury arose through the negligence of a contractor,
employed by the city, who created the condition causing the
mishap.68 Likewise, in Baltimore v. Beck, 9 the City was
held responsible for injuries resulting from insufficient
lighting at a place where construction materials were lying;
in Baltimore v. Walker,70 for injuries sustained from fall-
ing over a stop-box which projected two or three inches
from the pavement; in McCarthy v. Clarke,7 1 where a pe-
destrian fell over a manhole frame left on the pavement;
in Baltimore v. Leonard,72 ; and in Cordish v. Bloom,"
where the plaintiff caught his foot in a cellar door located
in the sidewalk. Baltimore City is similarly responsible
for other types of nuisances74 and in a proper case injunc-
tive relief will be given75 ; all other municipalities of the
of iron hooks in loading a vessel with dynamite. It was conceded that
the accident occurred without the corporate limits of the city but it was
alleged to have happened within the jurisdiction and control of the munici-
pality. The Police Commissioners were charged with the duty of enforcing
municipal ordinances so the city was not liable. Among other reasons
for denying the plaintiff recovery, the court says, 127 Md. 507: "The exer-
cise by the city of its authority to provide for the safety of persons or
property, where its corporate or proprietary interests do not require such
action, Is a governmental function for the non-performance of which It
cannot be sued, unless such right of action is given by statute."
16 Cordish v. Bloom, 138 Md. 8, 81, 113 A. 578 (1921).
67 Ibid.
"' Balto. v. O'Donnell, 53 Md. 110 (1879) (contractor stretched a rope
across a street which was being repaired to prevent travel thereon. Plain-
tiff ran into it at night.).
69 96 Md. 183, 53 A. 976 (1903).
7098 Md. 637, 57 A. 4 (1904).
71 115 Md. 454, 81 A. 12 (1911).
72 129 Md. 621, 99 A. 891 (1917) ; see: supra note 45.
'13 138 Md. 81, 113 A. 578 (1921).
71 Balto. v. Merryman, 86 Md. 584, 39 A. 98 (1898) (land overflowed by
obstructions in stream) ; Taylor v. Balto., 130 Md. 133, 99 A. 900, L. R. A.
1917 C 1046 (offensive odors-sewage disposal plant); Balto. v. Sackett,
135 Md. 56, 67 A. 557, 5 A. L. R. 915 (1919) (garbage reduction plant);
see also: Charter and Public Local Laws of Balto. City (1927), Sec. 6, subs.
9 and cases there listed.
15 Balto. v. Fairfield Improvement Co., 87 Md. 352, 360, 39 A. 1081 (1898)
(leper placed on former hospital site) ; Block v. Balto., 149 Md. 39, 129 A.
887 (1925) (stench and fly nuisance); Balto. v. Board of Health, 139 Md.
211, 115 A. 43 (1921) (garbage disposal); Livezey v. Town of Bel Air, 199
A. 838 (Md. 1938).
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state are, of course, similarly responsible for nuisances
caused by themselves or other agencies. 7
Waterworks and Sewers
Maryland is in accord with the majority in holding that
supplying water for the purpose of extinguishing fires is
a governmental function. ". .. a municipal corporation, in
maintaining waterworks, not only sells water to its inhabi-
tants for domestic purposes, in the performance of which
function it is practically always held to be acting in a pri-
vate corporate capacity and for its own benefit, but also
gratuitously furnishes water to be used in extinguishing
fires, in the performance of which duty it is acting in a
public governmental capacity. '" In the former case,
therefore, tort liability arises, in the latter it does not.
The municipality is likewise responsible for the proper
construction and maintenance of sewers. 7  But, it is said,
recovery against the city is difficult in cases of breaks in
the water-mains or sewers: "Before one may recover for
damages sustained either to the person or the property, by
reason of a break in either of the two systems, it must be
shown that the system was either defectively constructed,
or that after being apprised of the break in the system,
there was negligence in repairing the same." ' 79  The same
rules of notice, and negligence are applicable here as in
the highway cases.
Miscellaneous
There is but little Maryland law on the subject of tort
liability for injuries sustained on municipal wharfs, piers,
7 Taylor v. Cumberland, 64 Md. 68, 20 A. 1027 (1885) (coasting on
street) ; Cochrane v. Frostburg, 81 Md. 54, 31 A. 703 (1895) (cattle running
at large on street); Hagerstown v. Klotz, 93 Md. 437, 49 A. 836 (1901)
(bicycles propelled at excessive speed) ; Havre de Grace v. Fletcher, 112 Md.
562, 77 A. 114 (1910) (pedestrian injured by falling of stack of beer kegs
which had been allowed to remain adjacent to a footway).
7 Wallace v. Baltimore, 123 Md. 638, 642, 91 A. 687 (1914); see
also: 62 A. L. R. 1205, 1221; 54 A. L. R. 1497; 28 A. L. R. 822; 24 A. L. R.
545. In Merryman v. Balto., 153 Md. 419, 138 A. 324 (1927) it was held
that the city was liable for loss of rent due to failure of collector of water
rents to install pipes and supply water to the premises within a reasonable
time after acceptance of application.
79 Hitchins v. Frostburg, 68 Md. 100, 11 A. 826, 16 Am. St. R. 422 (1887);
Frostburg v. Hitchins Bros., 70 Md. 56, 16 A. 380 (1888); Frostburg v.
Dufty, 70 Md. 47, 16 A. 642 (1889) ; Balto. v. Schnitker, 84 Md. 34, 34 A.
1132 (1896); Kurrle v. Balto., 113 Md. 63, 77 A. 373 (1910); Kranz v.
Balto., 64 Md. 491, 2 A. 908 (1886).
"' Edwin J. Wolf, op. cit. supra note 53.
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and docks. In Baltimore v. De Palma,° the city owned a
pier which it devoted to the exclusive use of lumber mer-
chants and persons having business with them. Boys had
been repeatedly driven off and arrested for going there-
on. The ten year old plaintiff, who was injured on the
pier was not allowed to recover. The plaintiff contended
the pier was a public highway, but the Court said that even
if this assumption were indulged in, the particular pier in
question was not such, as it was not open to the public
generally. The Court also held the doctrine of attractive
nuisance inapplicable. The latter doctrine, although rec-
ognized by our Court of Appeals, has not, so far, had a
proper case for its application.8 '
There is no liability on the city for an ultra vires tort:
"If the act was void because ultra vires, and they (Mayor
and City Council) had no power to authorize it before it
was undertaken and commenced, they certainly had no
power to adopt it after it was done." '8 2
A Maryland statute places liability on cities and coun-
ties for the destruction of property by rioters or mobs.
Relief has been given injured persons under these sec-
tions.s8 Responsibility is limited, however, as it is "the
intention of this article that no such liability shall de-
volve on such county, town or city, unless the authorities
having notice have also the ability of themselves, or with
their own citizens, to prevent said injury."8 4
80137 Md. 179, 112 A. 277 (1920) ; see also: 19 R. C. L., p. 1134; and
Baltimore v. Steam Packet Co., 164 Md. 284, 292, 164 A. 878 (1932) where,
in a case involving the interpretation of a grant of exclusive use of the
pier, by ordinance, to the defendant company, the court said: "The ordinary
piers belonging to the City are in a material respect unlike the streets and
other property to be maintained for the general public use. Held in what
has been distinguished as the private ownership of the City, they are avail-
able to be given over into exclusive private use, for the purpose of raising
revenue."
SIl Grube v. Balto., 132 Md. 355, 361, 103 A. 948 (1918) (boy Injured by
electric current after climbing pole in schoolyard) ; see also: State, use of
Lease, v. Bealmear, 149 Md. 10, 130 A. 66 (1925) ; State, use of Potter, v.
Longeley, 161 Md. 563, 158 A. 6 (1930) ; see also: 36 A. L. R. 84, 139, 213;
39 A. L. R. 486; 45 A. L. R. 982; 53 A. L. R. 1344; 60 A. L. R. 1444; 20
R. C. L. 79; and see: Attractive Nuisances in the Supreme Court of the
U. S. and the Court of Appeals of Maryland, by E. Paul Fody, The Daily
Record, Sept. 27, 1938.
32 Horn v. Balto., 30 Md. 218, 224 (1869) (unauthorized grading) ; Valen-
tine v. Road Directors, 146 Md. 199, 126 A. 147 (1924) (Allegheny County
Commissioners maintained defective bridge in Pennsylvania).
83a Md. Code, Art. 82, Secs. 1, 2, 3, 4.
8 Balto. v. Poultney and Trimble, 25 Md. 107 (1866); Hagerstown v.
Dechert, 32 Md. 369 (1869); Hagerstown v. Sehner, 37 Md. 180 (1872).
" Md. Code, Art. 82. Sec. 2.
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CONCLUSION
Municipal governments (and state and federal govern-
ments as well) are not entities existing separate and apart
from the communities for whose service they have been
established. Governments are methods whereby people
regulate their own societal action so that each may live
in some degree of comfort and security with the others.
Such purpose is not achieved when an individual mem-
ber of the community, himself without fault, is made to
bear the entire cost of the injury done him by a servant of
the community. But so long as the distinction between gov-
ernmental and proprietary functions is maintained, legisla-
tive action is the only method by which municipal immu-
nity may be abolished. Such method is, more often than
not, a difficult and interminable undertaking."5 "But how-
ever unjustified the premise of sovereign irresponsibility,
it has stood rather stubbornly, even if not impregnably,
in the way of statutory reform designed to overcome the
injustice of these superannuated judicial doctrines . . .
(which have) . . . by dint of iteration and reiteration ac-
quired something of the sacred character of articles of
faith.' '86 Another writer says: "The whole doctrine of
governmental immunity from liability for torts rests upon
a rotten foundation." 7 Such structural weakness requires
rebuilding.
Some of the difficulties that will attend the legislators'
efforts are pointed out in the American Bar Association
Journal.88 They are of substantive, procedural, political
and financial natures: "Some risks life in an organized com-
munity necessarily imposes. Certain types of activity fall-
ing more closely within the legislative or judicial function
must be exempted from liability. Small communities also
would vote against an enlargement of community liability,
on the ground that a single accident might cripple them
financially. Shall the liability be confined only to munici-
palities having large populations, or shall the smaller unit
be brought in by distribution of the risk between the unit
and the state? Shall the system of insurance, either of
" The Federal Government has, for over a decade, had under considera-
tion a comprehensive Federal Tort Claims Bill. See: Borchard, Recent
Statutory Developments in Municipal Liability in Tort, 2 Legal Notes on
Local Government, Sept., 1936, 89-100.
80 Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort-Proposed Statutory
Reform, 20 A. B. A. J. 747 (1934).
11 Annotation, 75 A. L. R. 1196.
s' Borchard, op. cit. supra note 86.
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public officers with government defense of suits against
them, or of direct public liability insurance for torts be
adopted ?" 9
The movement for statutory reform is not altogether
uninitiated and strides have been made in several states,
notably in New York,90 California, 1 Minnesota,92 Wiscon-
sin, 9 and Ohio 94. It is hoped that Maryland will join the
ranks of these who are attempting to diminish the "lordly
prerogative of wrongdoing. 'Y5
Ibid, p. 750; appended thereto is a "Tentative draft of a possible state
act for the settlement of claims against the State of ............ and its
political subdivisions on account of property damage, personal injury, or
death." Doubtlessly, some parts thereof might commend themselves to
the attention of our legislators. Professor Borchard, in the article cited
supra note 85, refers to the New York statute as one which has proved
"economical and efficient".
"Ch. 467, Laws 1929.
91 Gen. Laws of Cal. (Deering) (1931). Acts 5149, 5150. (Municipal
liability for injuries to person or property received in highways, buildings,
parks, grounds, etc.)
02 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1936 Supp.) Sees. 1920-1, 1920-2, authorizing towns
and school districts having an assessed valuation over $2,000,000 to carry
insurance against liability of employees of any department, and to defend
suit and pay claims arising from injuries caused by negligent operation
of motor vehicles.
8Wis. Stat. (1937) 66.095 at p. 913. (Liability ror injuries by munici-
pally owned and operated motor vehicles. This statute was upheld in
Shumacher v. Milwaukee, 209 Wis. 43, 243 N. W. 756, 757 (1932) where the
court says: "If municipal business was not intended to include all busi-
ness transacted In the performance of a governmental function then the
section amounts to nothing" because the city was already liable in its pro-
prietary capacity. The injury had been caused by a fire truck.)
91 Page's Annotated Ohio General Code, Perm. Supp. 1935, See. 3714.
9 Maguire, State Liability for Tort (1916), 30 H. L. R. 20, 37. The
Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act recognizes, at least in one situa-
tion, that sovereign immunity is inconsistent with present day social needs.
Md. Code Supp. Art. 101, §35 provides: "Whenever the State, County, City
or any municipality shall engage in any extra-hazardous work, within the
meaning of this Article, whether for pecuniary gain or otherwise, in which
workmen are employed for wages, this Article shall be applicable thereto."
Section 32 lists the various types of extra-hazardous employments.
